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Abstract
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) is proved to be able to
eliminate all potential detector side channel attacks. Combining with the reference frame indepen-
dent (RFI) scheme, the complexity of practical system can be reduced because of the unnecessary
alignment for reference frame. Here, based on polarization multiplexing, we propose a time-bin
encoding structure, and experimentally demonstrate the RFI-MDI-QKD protocol. Thanks to this,
two of the four Bell states can be distinguished, whereas only one is used to generate the secure
key in previous RFI-MDI-QKD experiments. As far as we know, this is the first demonstration for
RFI-MDI-QKD protocol with clock rate of 50 MHz and distance of more than hundred kilometers
between legitimate parties Alice and Bob. In asymptotic case, we experimentally compare RFI-
MDI-QKD protocol with the original MDI-QKD protocol at the transmission distance of 160 km,
when the different misalignments of the reference frame are deployed. By considering observables
and statistical fluctuations jointly, four-intensity decoy-state RFI-MDI-QKD protocol with biased
bases is experimentally achieved at the transmission distance of 100km and 120km. The results
show the robustness of our scheme, and the key rate of RFI-MDI-QKD can be improved obviously
under a large misalignment of the reference frame.
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INTRODUCTION
In this highly intelligent age, the privacy of information is vital to the personal life, the
management of companies and governments. Recently, researchers turned to physical theory,
such as quantum physics, rather than the mathematical complexities to find an unconditional
security scheme. Such is the significance of quantum key distribution (QKD) [1], which has
been attracted widely attention nowadays. Tremendous theoretic and experimental efforts
have been made in this field [2–9].
However, the actual performance of practical apparatuses should be taken into account in
a real QKD system, otherwise the gap between theoretical and practical model will weaken
its security [10–18]. There are three main approaches to close this gap. The first one is
the security patch [19, 20], but it is not universal for all potential and unnoticed security
loopholes. The second one is the device-independent QKD (DI-QKD) [21–23], which is still
challenging with current technology since a loophole-free Bell test is needed [24]. The third
and the most promising approach is measurement device independent QKD (MDI-QKD)
[25, 26]. It successfully removes all detection-related security loopholes, which means secure
key can be generated even when measurement unit is fully controlled by the adversary
Eve. Furthermore, with current technology, MDI-QKD can provide a solution to build more
security long-distance key distribution links or metropolitan networks [27, 28].
The merits of MDI-QKD protocol have attracted extensive attention in recent decades,
a series of achievements have been made in both theories [29–33] and experiments [34–38].
Since relative phase and time-bins of pulses can be firmly maintained along the transmission,
time-bin encoding is a suitable scheme for fiber based QKD system, whereas the polarization
of light is not stable due to the birefringence of fiber. It is noted that most of experiments
based on time-bin encoding schemes can only distinguish one Bell state, such as |ψ−〉, which
will eventually lead a factor of 3/4 loss in the final key. In addition, an active reference frame
alignment is needed to ensure the higher secure key rate. Although additional calibration
parts appear feasible, they increase the complexity of the MDI-QKD system, which may
lead to extra information leakage through these ancillary processes [39].
As a promising solution to eliminate the requirements for reference frame calibration,
reference-frame-independent (RFI) MDI-QKD protocol is proposed [40]. As far as we know,
only two experimental verifications were made until now [41, 42], whose systems are worked
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at 1 MHz, and the longest distance between Alice and Bob is 20km. The experimental
demonstration with a higher clock rate and longer transmission distance is still missing.
Furthermore, although simulations are carried out to compare the performance of RFI-
MDI-QKD protocol with the original MDI-QKD protocol under the different misalignments
of reference frames [43, 44], a clearly experimental comparison is also missing.
In this paper, we propose an effective time-bin encoding scheme based on the polarization
multiplexing. Combining with the efficient detecting scheme proposed in our previous work
[45], both bell states |ψ±〉 can be distinguished, which means the factor of loss in the final key
can be reduced to 1/2. The proof-of-principle experiment based on RFI-MDI-QKD protocol
over a symmetrical channel is made to show the feasibility of our scheme. The system clock
rate is improved to 50 MHz. In asymptotic case, we compare the performance of RFI-MDI-
QKD protocol with the original MDI-QKD protocol at the transmission distance of 160 km.
The key rate of an order of magnitude higher is achieved for RFI-MDI-QKD protocol when
misalignment of the relative reference frame β is controlled at 25 degrees. For real-world
applications, we deploy decoy-state RFI-MDI-QKD protocol with biased bases proposed in
[44] for our system. By employing an elegant statistical fluctuation analysis proposed in
[42], the positive secure key rates are achieved for β = 0◦ at the transmission distance of
120km and for β = 25◦ at the transmission distance of 100km. We believe this result can
further illustrate the feasibility and the merit of RFI-MDI-QKD protocol under the higher
clock rate and longer secure transmission distance, especially at the situation when a large
misalignment of reference frame occurred. Eliminating the calibration of primary reference
frames of the system will definitely reduce the complexity of the realistic setup, and prevent
extra information leakage through the ancillary alignment processes.
PROTOCOL
In both RFI-MDI-QKD and the original MDI-QKD protocol, Alice and Bob are firstly
required a random selection in the several mutually orthogonal bases to prepare their
phase randomized weak coherent states, which are Z basis states (|0〉, |1〉), X basis states
(|+〉=(|0〉+ |1〉)/√2, |−〉=(|0〉 − |1〉)/√2) for the original MDI-QKD protocol, and addi-
tional Y basis sates (|+i〉=(|0〉+ i |1〉)/√2, |−i〉=(|0〉 − i |1〉)/√2) are required in RFI-
MDI-QKD protocol. They are then send to an untrusted relay Charlie, who performs
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a Bell state measurement (BSM) and announces the corresponding measurement results.
Charlie’s measurement will projects the incoming states into one of two Bell states |ψ+〉 =
(|01〉+ |10〉) /√2 or |ψ−〉 = (|01〉 − |10〉) /√2. Alice and Bob keep the data that conform
to these instances and discard the rest. After basis sifting and error estimation, they can
obtain the total counting rate QλAλBiAiB and quantum bit error rate (QBER) E
λAλB
iAiB
, where
λA(B) ∈ {µi, νi, o} denotes Alice (Bob) randomly prepare their signal states µi, decoy states
νi for basis iA(B) ∈ {Z,X, Y }, or vacuum states o. It is noted that Alice and Bob do not
choose any bases for vacuum states.
If the deviation of the practical reference from the ideal one βA(B) is considered, Z basis
is assumed well aligned (ZA = ZB = Z), X and Y bases can be written as follows [40, 41]:
XB = cos βXA + sin βYA,
YB = cos βYA − sin βYA,
β = |βA − βB|/2.
(1)
The secure key is extracted from the data when both Alice and Bob encode their bits
using signal states (µ) in the Z basis. The rest of the data are applied to estimate the
parameters used in the secure key rate calculation. The secure key rate is given by [25, 42]
R ≥ PzzP µµzz
{
µ2e−2µS11,LZZ [1− IE]−QµµZZfH (EµµZZ)
}
, (2)
where S11,LZZ is a lower bound of the yield of single-photon states in Z basis, Pzz is the
probability that both Alice and Bob send the Z basis state, and P µµzz is the signal state
probability when both the Z basis states are sent from Alice (Bob) respectively. Parameter
f is the error correction efficiency, and H (x) = −xlog2 (x)−(1− x) log2 (1− x) is the binary
Shannon entropy function.
When sources in both Alice and Bob are assumed perfect, Eve’s information IE in Eq.(2)
can be estimated by IE = H(e
11,U
XX ) for the original MDI-QKD protocol, where e
11,U
XX is a
upper bound of quantum error rate of single-photon states in X basis. As for RFI-MDI-
QKD protocol, IE can be bounded by [40]
IE = (1− e11,UZZ )H [(1 + u) /2] + e11,UZZ H [(1 + v) /2] ,
v =
√
C/2− (1− e11,UZZ )
2
u2/e11,UZZ ,
u = min[C/2/(1− e11,UZZ ), 1].
(3)
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Obviously, IE is a function of upper bound of quantum error rate of single-photon states in
Z basis e11,UZZ and the quantity C. When there is no Eve and other errors, C always equals
to 2. In order to upper bound the Eve’s information IE, the value of C should be lower
bounded, it can be estimated by
C ≥
∑
ω′
min
[
(1− 2e11,Uω′ )
2
, (1− 2e11,Lω′ )
2
]
, (4)
where ω′ ∈ {XAXB, XAYB, YAXB, YAYB} and e11,U(L)ω′ is a upper (lower) bound of the quan-
tum error rate of single-photon states when Alice and Bob choose the ω′ basis simulta-
neously. Note that EµµXAYB and E
µµ
YAXB
are theoretically symmetrical about 0.5. Thus we
assume EλAλBω′ ≤ 0.5 for simplicity, if not, Bob can simply flip his bits corresponding to the
relevant basis X, Y. In this scenario, the value C can be simplified by C ≥ ∑
ω′
(1− 2e11ω′)2,
where e11ω′ = min
{
0.5, e11,Uω′
}
.
EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
The time-bin encoding method is used in our system, and the experimental setup is
shown in Fig. 1. For both Alice and Bob, we employ a distributed feedback (DFB) laser
combined with a home-built drive board. By operating the laser below and above the lasering
threshold, we first generate phase-randomized laser pulses with a 2 ns temporal width and 50
MHz repetition rate, which eliminates the possibility of an unambiguous-state-discrimination
attack [46]. The electrical pulses are created by an field-programmable gate array (FPGA)-
based signal generator (not pictured in Fig. 1). In order to calibrate the wavelength, the
laser pulses are injected into an optical spectrum analyzer (YOKOGAWA AQ6370D, OSA)
through the BSs after two lasers. The OSA, whose resolution is 10-20 pm, is used to monitor
the wavelength difference of two independent lasers, which can be minimized by precisely
adjusting the operating temperature of lasers through the temperature controllers on the
laser drive boards.
Since Alice’s and Bob’s parts are symmetrical, here we use Alice’s part as an example to
illustrate our experimental setups. To realize the decoy states preparation, intensity mod-
ulator (IM, Photline, MXER-LN-10) is used to modulate the laser pulses into two different
intensities, the vacuum states are prepared by stopping the trigger on lasers. The circu-
lator (Cir) is used to transmit the incident pulses from port 1 to port 2. Each of pulses
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FIG. 1. Experimental setup of our scheme. Laser, a distributed feedback (DFB) laser combined
with a home-built drive board; EPC, electronic polarization controller; PC, polarization controller;
IM, intensity modulator; PM, phase modulator; PS, phase shifter; Cir, circulator, its ports and
directions is labelled above; ATT, attenuator; SPD, single photon detector; QC, a SMF-28 fiber
spool, its channel attenuation is measured at α = 0.195dB/km; BS, beam splitter; PBS, polarizing
beam splitter; FR, 90◦ Faraday rotator; AMZI, asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interferometer; SI,
Sagnac interferometer.
TABLE I. The detail of time-bin encoding scheme.
|0〉 |1〉 |+〉 |−〉 |+i〉 |−i〉
PM1 0 pi pi2
pi
2
pi
2
pi
2
PM2 0 0 0 pi pi2
3pi
2
is then divided into two adjacent pulses with 5 ns separation by first modified asymmetric
Mach-Zehnder interferometer (AMZI1), which is composed of a beam splitter (BS) and a
polarizing beam splitter (PBS). The relative phase of these two successive pulses is modu-
lated by the phase modulator (PM1, Photline, MPZ-LN-10) in Sagnac interferometer (SI).
When the phase of 0 or pi is modulated, Z basis state can be prepared. We define the light
passing through the upper path of the second AMZI (AMZI2) as the time-bin state |0〉, and
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lower path of AMZI2 as the time-bin state |1〉. These two time-bins are separated by 4.2
ns time delay. When the phase of pi/2 is modulated by PM1, the phase modulated by PM2
in AMZI2 are 0, pi for X basis, and pi/2, 3pi/2 for Y basis. For detail, we list our time-bin
encoding scheme in Table I.
It is obviously that IM or variable optical attenuator (VOA) is needless to normalize the
average photon number of Z basis states in two time bins [27, 28, 42], these can be achieved
only by adjusting the modulating voltage value of PM1 accordingly in our system. This also
reduces the complexity of the system to some extent. Furthermore, orthogonal polarization
states (H, V ) are multiplexed to the time bins because of the PBS at the output of AMZI2.
For the sake of comparing the performance in different misalignment, phase shifters (PS) in
AMZI2 are applied to control the reference frame, the parameter of quantum error rate in
X basis EλAλBXAXB as a guide to set the deviation of relative reference frame. Note that the
whole time-bin encoding units are strictly thermal and mechanical isolated to enhance its
stability.
At the measurement site, since the time bins are multiplexed with the orthogonal po-
larization states (H and V ), we can use the PBS to demultiplex them easily. Two electric
polarization controllers (EPC, General Photonics, PCD-M02-4X) is used to control the po-
larization fluctuations that change polarization of input light until the SPD count rate are
maximized and hence all polarization changes during photon transmission are compensated
for. Two BSs are used to realize the interference. Four commercial InGaAs SPDs (ID210)
with an efficiency of ηd = 12.5%, a dark count rate of Pd = 1.2×10−6 and a dead time of 5 µs
are placed at each output of the BSs. Therefore, all results of BSM are effectively detected,
we define the Bell state |ψ+〉 is D1 and D4 or D2 and D3 in Fig. 1 clicks simultaneously,
and the clicks of D1 and D3 or D2 and D4 is represented by |ψ−〉. The parameters for
experiment and numerical simulations are listed in Table II.
TABLE II. Parameters for experiment and numerical simulations.
ηd ed α Pd f
12.5% 0.5% 0.195dB/km 1.2× 10−6 1.16
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We first test the indistinguishability of the photons from Alice and Bob by measuring the
visibility of Hong-Ou-Mandel (HOM). We obtain a visibility of 42.7%, which is smaller than
the maximally possible value of 50% for weak coherence source. The low visibility of HOM
is mainly caused by detector side imperfections due to after-pulses, it has been studied that
after-pulses effect of SPADs has greater impact on the measurement of HOM visibility [47].
Furthermore, two PBSs are used before interference in our scheme, the change of polarization
of incident pulses after long transmission distance will lead to a fluctuating intensity, and
the finite extinction ration (about 20dB) of PBS will also lower the visibility. Moreover,
the beam splitting ratio and detection efficiency mismatch of detectors can influence the
visibility of HOM partly as discussed in [47]. The central wavelength of laser pulses is
1558.18nm after calibration. Next, we will show and discuss our experimental results for
asymptotic case and finite-size pulses case separately.
Asymptotic case
In asymptotic case, we adopt symmetrical three-intensity decoy-state protocol for simplic-
ity, which means µi = µi′=µ for signal states and νi = νi′=ν for decoy states. By modeling
the total gains and error rates of our system (See Appendices A and B for details), we find
the optimal value of average photon number for the original MDI-QKD protocol (O-MDI)
and RFI-MDI-QKD protocol (R-MDI) is almost the same, as depicted with blue and purple
dash line in Fig. 3, when misalignment of the reference frame is controlled at β = 0◦. This
means the secure key rate (SKR) for both protocols can be obtained from a single experi-
ment. The simulation and experimental results are presented in Table III and Fig. 2, which
shows two curves are almost overlapped (Red line for R-MDI and blue dash line for O-MDI).
We set the average photon number of vacuum state to be 0 since there is no pulses emitted
when the trigger on lasers are paused. The value of C for R-MDI is estimated to 1.668. The
QBER of 0.6% are obtain for Z basis, it comes from the successful BSM declared by Charlie
when Alice and Bob prepared the same states in Z basis. In the ideal case, the QBER of Z
basis should be 0, whereas, the detector’s dark counts and finite extinction ratio of the first
AMZI in Fig. 1 will lead to incorrect coincidence counts and thus increase the QBER of Z
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basis. Meanwhile, the vacuum and multiphoton components of weak coherent states cause
accidental coincidences which introduce an error rate of 50%. Thus, the error rate of the X
basis has an expected value of 25% and so is for Y basis. However, when the visibility of
HOM is lower than 50%, the QBER of X basis will higher than 25% since the error counts
come from the situation when Bell state |ψ+〉 was announced as Alice and Bob prepared
the same states in X basis, or |ψ−〉 was declared as orthogonal states were prepared. In our
system, it is measured at 27.9%.
TABLE III. Experimental results when mis-
alignment of reference frame are β = 0◦ and
β = 25◦.
Protocol µ ν EµµZZ E
µµ
XX IE SKR
β = 0◦*
R-MDI
0.67 0.01 0.006 0.279
0.254 5.225× 10−8
O-MDI 0.296 4.690× 10−8
β = 25◦
R-MDI 0.67 0.01 0.008 0.348 0.297 4.866× 10−8
O-MDI 0.35 0.01 0.010 0.338 0.686 1.655× 10−9
* The optimal average photon number for O-MDI
and R-MDI is identical when misalignment of
the reference frame is controlled at β = 0◦.
Thus, the SKR for both protocols can be ob-
tained from a single experiment. The µ and ν
are optimized in all the test.
In order to investigate the performance of RFI-MDI-QKD protocol and the original MDI-
QKD protocol at the nonzero deviation of the relative reference frame, we can control the
voltage of PS in Fig. 1 according to the simulation result of EµµXX to simulate this deviation.
Fig. 3 presents the SKR and the optimal average photon number vs different deviation of
the reference frame β when the transmission distance between Alice and Bob is 160 km. It
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FIG. 2. Lower secure key rate bound of RFI-MDI-QKD protocol (R-MDI) and the original MDI-
QKD protocol (O-MDI) when the deviations of reference frame are controlled at β = 0◦ and
β = 25◦. Except for simulating green curve and purple dashed curve, all average photon number
settings of signal state and decoy state are optimized for each of transmission distance. The
inserted figure is partial magnification for the experimental results. The horizontal axis represents
the distance between Alice (Bob) and Charlie, and quantum channel is symmetric.
is obvious that O-MDI is particularly dependent on the change of β. However, the SKR and
the optimal average photon number for R-MDI is almost identical at different deviation of
the reference frame. Thus, for R-MDI at β = 25◦, we keep the values of average photon
number in consistency with the setting at β = 0◦. In this case, the simulation results in Fig.
2 show the red curve for β = 0◦ is almost overlapped with green curve marked with crosses
for β = 25◦. As comparison, the optimal value of µ and ν for O-MDI at β = 25◦ is used
to conduct the experimental test. The related experimental results are presented in Table
III and Fig. 2. The value of C for R-MDI is estimated to 1.595. At β = 25◦, the secure
key rate of R-MDI is close to the one at β = 0◦, and is an order of magnitude higher than
O-MDI at the transmission distance of 160 km. Thus, unlike the O-MDI, the changes of the
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FIG. 3. Lower secure key rate bound and optimal average photon number of RFI-MDI-QKD
protocol (R-MDI) and the original MDI-QKD protocol (O-MDI) versus the different misalignments
of reference frame at the distance of 160 km. Since the simulation results are symmetrical about
β = 45◦, this figure only shows the curves at β changed from 0◦ to 45◦.
reference frame nearly cannot influence the secure key rete of R-MDI, neither can optimal
average photon number settings. These results well illustrate the robust of RFI-MDI-QKD
protocol against the deviation of relative reference frame.
Finite-size pulses case
In real-world applications, the key size is always finite, thus we must consider the effect
of statistical fluctuations caused by a finite pulses size. Such an analysis is crucial to ensure
the security of RFI-MDI-QKD. Three-intensity decoy-state RFI-MDI-QKD protocol with
biased bases proposed in [44] have been proved that achievable secret key rate and trans-
mission distance can be obviously improved compared with the original protocol, since this
protocol avoids the futility in Z basis for decoy states, thus it can simplify the operation of
system. Recently, a universal analysis appropriate for fluctuating systems with an arbitrary
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number of observables is developed in [42], it is showed that by adopting both the collective
constraints and joint parameter estimation techniques, the secret key rate and transmis-
sion distance can be impressively improved for four-intensity decoy-state RFI-MDI-QKD
protocol.
Here, by using this elegant fluctuation analysis method, we deploy the four-intensity
decoy-state RFI-MDI-QKD protocol with biased bases for our experiment. In this scheme,
expect for vacuum states, Alice and Bob need to prepare signal states µz for Z basis and µx
for both X basis and Y basis due to the symmetry of the X, Y basis in Eq. (4), whereas the
decoy states νx are prepared only for X basis and Y basis. All related parameter including
µz, µx, νx, Pz, Px, and P
µx
x should be optimized to achieve the highest secure key rate. It is
found that the achievable secure key rate and transmission distance in this scheme can also
be notably improved as showed in Fig. 4.
We apply the Chernoff bound for the fluctuation estimation in our experiment, with a
fixed failure probability of ε = 10−10 and a total number of pulse pairs N = 3× 1012. After
the simulation with full parameter optimization showed in Fig. 4, we find there are some
different results compared with the asymptotic case. It is obviously that RFI-MDI-QKD
deteriorates with the increase of β when statistical fluctuations are considered, which can
be explained that the correlations of e11XAXB , e
11
YAYB
, e11XAYB , and e
11
YAXB
are smeared with the
increase of β, thus it leads to poor estimation of the value of C in Eq. (4). Furthermore, the
setup of optimal values for experiment will change as the increase of β, whereas it almost
keeps the same in asymptotic case as showed in Fig. 3. For instance, when transmission
distance is 100km, the optimal signal intensity setting for Z basis µz at β = 0
◦ is 0.4407,
while it will be 0.2648 if β = 25◦.
TABLE IV. Experimental results when statistical fluctuations are considered.
Distance β µzz E
µµ
ZZ C IE SKR
100 km 25◦ 0.265 0.9% 0.44 0.83 1.22× 10−10
120 km 0◦ 0.324 1.15% 0.56 0.78 2.30× 10−10
We experimentally demonstrate the feasible of four-intensity biased decoy-state scheme
when statistical fluctuations are considered. Secure key rates for transmission distances of
120 km and 100 km are obtain, which are presented in Table IV and Fig. 4. Their deviations
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of reference frame are controlled at β = 0◦ and β = 25◦ respectively.
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FIG. 4. Lower secure key rate bound of RFI-MDI-QKD protocol (R-MDI) with biased bases when
statistical fluctuations are considered. Black dashed line is the results at β = 25◦ using the original
method proposed in [44]. The total number of pulse pairs sent from Alice and Bob is N = 3×1012,
the failure probability is ε = 10−10, and the full parameter optimization method is applied. The
horizontal axis represents the distance between Alice (Bob) and Charilie, and quantum channel is
symmetric.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, a high-speed clock rate of 50 MHz and long distance of more than hundred
kilometers RFI-MDI-QKD is demonstrated based on the time-bin and polarization multi-
plexing. Two of the four Bell states |ψ±〉 can be distinguished without a loss. And the
states in different bases can be prepared by only using phase modulators without the need
for intensity modulators. The value of quantum error rate of Z basis EµµZZ shows the fea-
sibility of this scheme. In asymptotic case, we experimentally compare the performance of
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RFI-MDI-QKD protocol and original MDI-QKD protocol under the difference deviation of
reference frame at the distance of 160km. It shows that the secure key rate used RFI-MDI-
QKD protocol is an order of magnitude higher than the one used the original MDI-QKD
when the misalignment of reference frame is β = 25◦. Moreover, a simulation model for PFI-
MDI-QKD protocol is given, and together with the experimental results, the robustness of
PFI-MDI-QKD protocol against reference frame change is been verified since the invariant
of secure key rate and optimal average photon numbers under the different deviation of the
reference frame. The four-intensity decoy-state RFI-MDI-QKD protocol with biased bases is
employed to take statistical fluctuations into account in our experiment. By adopting both
the collective constraints and joint parameter estimation techniques, the achievable secret
key rate and transmission distance is improved obviously compared with the original biased
decoy-state RFI-MDI-QKD protocol. We also firstly experimentally achieved this protocol
at the transmission distance of 120km when the deviation of reference frame is controlled at
β = 0◦ and at the distance of 100km when β = 25◦.
APPENDIX A: SIMULATION MODEL
In order to simulate the protocol performance and get the optimal value of average photon
number for experimental system, we need firstly derive the model for total counting rate
QλAλBiAiB and error counting rate EQ
λAλB
iAiB
. According to the method in [48], it is deduced by
QλAλBZAZB = QC +QE,
QλAλBZAZBE
λAλB
ZAZB
= edQC + (1− ed)QE,
QλAλBXAXB = 2y
2
[
2y2 − 4yI0 (x) + I0 (B) + I0 (E)
]
,
QλAλBXAXBE
λAλB
XAXB
= 2y2
[
y2 − 2yI0 (x) + edI0 (B) + (1− ed) I0 (E)
]
,
QλAλBXAYB = 2y
2
{
2y2 − 4yI0 (x) + I0 [Θ] + I0 [Ξ]
}
,
QλAλBXAYBE
λAλB
XAYB
= 2y2
{
y2 − 2yI0 (x) + edI0 [Ξ] + (1− ed) I0 [Θ]
}
,
QλAλBYAXBE
λAλB
YAXB
= 2y2
{
y2 − 2yI0 (x) + edI0 [Θ] + (1− ed) I0 [Ξ]
}
,
(A1)
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where
QC = 2(1− Pd)2e−µ′/2[1− (1− Pd) e−ηAλA/2]
×[1− (1− Pd) e−ηBλB/2],
QE = 2Pd(1− Pd)2e−µ′/2[I0 (2x)− (1− Pd) e−µ′/2],
B = 2x cos β,
E = 2x sin β,
Θ =
√
2x (cos β + sin β) ,
Ξ =
√
2x (cos β − sin β) ,
(A2)
I0 (·) is the modified Bessel function of the first kind, ed=0.005 is the misalignment-error
probability, Pd is the dark count of a single-photon detector, ηA (ηB) is the transmission of
Alice (Bob), and µ′ = ηAλA + ηBλA, x =
√
ηAλAηBλB/2 and y = (1 − Pd)e−µ′/4. Due to
the symmetry of quantum channel and the X ,Y basis in Eq. (4), we treat the parameters
of the X, Y basis and the average photon number setting for Alice and Bob equivalently
for simplicity. Accordingly, µA = µB, Q
λAλB
XAXB
= QλAλBYAYB , Q
λAλB
XAYB
= QλAλBYAXB , and EQ
λAλB
XAXB
=
EQλAλBYAYB . The quantum error rate can be calculated by E
λAλb
iAiB
= EQλAλbiAiB /Q
λAλb
iAiB
, it is obvious
that EλAλbXAYB and E
λAλb
YAXB
is symmetrical about 0.5. As mentioned above, we assume the
quantum error rate is smaller than 0.5 for simplicity, thus eλAλbXAYB = 1−EλAλbXAYB if EλAλbXAYB > 0.5.
APPENDIX B: SECURE KEY RATE ESTIMATION
The secure key rate of Eq. (2) is calculated with an analytical method with two decoy
states according to [42, 49].The lower bound and upper bound of the single-photon yield
and the error yield is given by
m11L ≥ T1 − T2 − a
′
1b
′
2T3
a1a′1 (b1b
′
2 − b′1b2)
,
m11U ≤ M
vivi − T3
a1b1
,
(B1)
where
T1 = a
′
1b
′
2M
vivi + a1b2a
′
0M
oµi + a1b2a
′
0M
µio,
T2 = a1b2M
µiµi + a1b2a
′
0b
′
0M
oo,
T3 = a0M
ovi + b0M
vio − a0b0M oo,
a′(b′)k = µ
k
i e
−µi/k!,
a(b)k = v
k
i e
−vi/k!.
(B2)
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In the above formula, MλAλB ∈ {QλAλB , EQλAλB}, m11 ∈ {S11, eS11}, i ∈ {Z,X, Y }, and
e11L(U) = eS11L(U)/S11U(L).
It is noted that the expression of Eq. (B1) is independent on ω, thus, we can use above
equations to estimate the parameters in Eq. (2) for asymptotic case, which are listed in
Table V, and then to calculate the secure key rate. However, since there only is signal states
for Z basis in biased decoy-state protocol, we emphasize that e11UZZ and e
11U
XX may be different
and should be estimated individually. By using the following formula
m11U ≤ M
uzuz − T ′3
a′1b
′
1
, (B3)
the upper bound of error yield for Z basis can be estimated. Where
T ′3 = a
′
0M
ouz + b′0M
uzo − a′0b′0M oo. (B4)
By using the fluctuation analysis method proposed in [42], the parameters used for secure
key rate estimation are listed in Table V.
TABLE V. Parameters estimated in the process of secure key rate calculation.
β e11UZZ e
11U
XX e
11U
Y Y e
11U
XY e
11U
Y X S
11L
ZZ (10
−6)
R-MDI in asymptotic case
0◦ 0.004 0.052 0.035 0.534 0.527 1.084
25◦ 0.005 0.174 0.225 0.176 0.166 1.221
O-MDI in in asymptotic case
0◦ 0.004 0.052 - - - 1.084
25◦ 0.005 0.182 - - - 1.200
R-MDI with biased bases in finite-data case
0◦ 0.020 0.262 0.212 0.683 0.631 6.959
25◦ 0.015 0.348 0.350 0.319 0.316 17.305
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